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ABSTRACT: The Barber Paradox is often introduced as a popular version of Russell’s 
paradox, though some philosophers and logicians (e.g. Church) have denied their 
similarity, even calling the Barber paradox a pseudoparadox. In the first part of the 
paper, we demonstrate mainly that in the standard (Quinean) definition of a paradox 
the Barber paradox is a clear-cut example of a non-paradox. In the second part of 
the paper, we examine a probable source of the paradoxicality of the Barber Paradox, 
which is found in a certain ambivalence in terms of meaning. The two different read-
ings of the crucial phrase yield distinct existential assumptions which produce the 
paradoxical conclusion.
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1. Introduction
One of the paradoxical aspects of the Barber paradox (BP) is that it is not a 
paradox, though many people still think it is.1 It is also paradoxical that its 
authorship is often attributed to Russell,2 even though he did not invent 
it,3 and even warned against it as a false analogy to Russell’s paradox (RP).4 
1 Including some philosophers that address paradoxes, e.g., Rescher (2001: 143–147).
2 Cf., e.g., the popular text Joyce (2002).
3 The probable author of the BP is the Austrian philosopher Mally. This guess originates 
from Church (1963: 106), who mentioned it in his short review of a paper by Johann Mokre. 
Mokre attributed the Postman Paradox (“Postabholer”, “Postzusteller”, cf. Mokre 1952: 82) to 
Mally: Consider a villager who volunteers to bring the mail to all those who do not go to get 
their own mail – does he bring the mail to himself? (Mokre 1952: 89).
4 Russell mentioned the BP explicitly as a false analogy to RP in his large study “The 
Philosophy of Logical Atomism” published in Monist 1918–19, cf. Russell (2010: 101).
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Finally, it is also somewhat paradoxical that despite what I have previously 
written, I will suggest a way to construe the BP as a real paradox.
This paper begins with an exposition of both RP and the BP, mainly 
showing the ways in which they are not similar. We will see that, according to 
the standard Quinean definition of a paradox, the BP is simply not a paradox 
at all. Then, I will attempt to reveal a possible source of the paradoxicality of 
the BP, which is based on a confusion of meaning. The degree of paradoxi-
cality will be studied for a modified BP.
2. (Dis)similarities between Russell’s paradox 
and the Barber paradox
I will operate from the standard definition of a paradox adopted from Quine’s 
seminal article “The Ways of Paradox” (1966):5 a paradox is an argument 
whose conclusion contradicts a widely shared opinion or, as I will call it, a 
naïve theory which forms a usually hidden premise of the argument. To il-
lustrate, the naïve theory of truth is, in the form of a certain general claim, 
a hidden premise of the Liar paradox. A paradox as an argument is usually 
reconstructed from its formulation, which is often rather incomplete, leaving 
the formation of the paradox to the imagination of a reader.
On the standard construal of paradoxes, the solution of a paradox con-
sists in a justified refutation of the problematic premise (or naïve theory) in 
question or in a justified refutation of some inferential step applied within the 
argument. By an approach to a certain group of paradoxes we may consider 
a proposal of a critical theory (as we may call it) which should replace the 
naïve one, together with an explanation of the paradoxicality of the paradoxes 
in question. (The notion of critical theory is usually not mentioned in the 
standard construal of paradoxes, yet it is involved in it; in some cases, critical 
theory takes form of an axiomatic theory.) For example, Tarski’s approach to 
the Liar Paradox explains the source of its paradoxicality and offers a critical 
theory of truth which does not lead to a paradox.
All these claims could be made more accurate, but let’s accept them as 
they are.6
5 The Quinean definition has been popularized by Sainsbury in his well-known in-
troductory book Paradoxes, in which he defines a paradox as: “an apparently unacceptable 
conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises” 
(Sainsbury 1995: 1).
6 Some doubts about the Quinean definition have been recently expressed, e.g., by Lycan 
(2010), yet they will not be considered here. I can raise some other doubts and some further 
doubts were presented to me by an anonymous reviewer; neither these doubts can be discussed 
here.
271J. RACLAVSKY: The Barber Paradox
RP, discovered by Russell at the very beginning of the 20th century, is 
the crucial modern paradox.7 Since a detailed description of RP does not lie 
within the scope of this paper, I am only going to state a few of its features 
which are needed for its comparison with the BP.
The hidden premise of RP is naïve set theory. More precisely, it is an 
opinion incorporated within it, i.e. the claim that a set can be defined by any 
condition (predicate8). This is usually articulated as the (naïve, unrestricted) 
Axiom of Comprehension (or Abstraction)
∀ϕ∃S∀x ((x∈S)↔ϕ(x)).
In other words, for any condition ϕ there is a set S of individuals satisfying 
the condition ϕ.
As is well known, Russell challenged this opinion with an attempt to 
define set R, Russell’s set, with the help of the expression:
the set of all (and only those) sets which are not members of themselves
which can be formalized as {S | S  ∉S}. Its core is the condition S  ∉S, which 
is quite legitimate in naïve set theory. However, Russell showed that there 
are complications with this. If we assume that R contains itself, we are then 
forced to conclude that it does not contain itself because R contains only 
those sets which are not members of themselves; on the other hand, if we 
assume that R does not contain itself, we must conclude that it does contain 
itself; in both cases there is a contradiction. To avoid the paradox, approaches 
such as Russell’s or Church’s type theory and Zermelo-Fraenkel’s set theory 
(which is one of the critical theories concerning sets) do not allow an un-
restricted version of the comprehension principle according to which any 
condition (predicate) defines a set.
A formulation similar to the following one is used to induce the BP:9 
In a certain village, there is a barber who shaves all (and only those) villagers 
7 There is a great amount of literature discussing RP. An important recent contribution 
is the compilation Link (2004).
8 Though there is a difference between predicates and conditions, we can abstract from 
it in this text.
9 One of the BP’s popular variants is the Catalogue Paradox formulated by the French 
mathematician Gonseth (1936: 254): In a certain library, there is a catalogue which lists all 
catalogues which do not list themselves – does this catalogue list itself? Gonseth (p. 255) de-
scribed this paradox as having both set and Barber variants.”§106. La structure du paradoxe 
des catalogues.” pp. 255–257. A very similar version is the bibliography of all bibliographies 
(cf., e.g., Rescher 2001: 144, where nearly a dozen such phrases are offered). Another popular 
version is the unnamed paradox concerning secretaries which was published by Johnston (1940: 
474) as a deliberately popular variant of the RP: There is a club C having a regulation ac-
cording to which only a secretary of a club to which she is not eligible to join can become a 
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who do not shave themselves – does the barber shave himself? If we assume 
that the barber does not shave himself, we conclude that he must also shave 
himself; if we assume that the barber does shave himself, we conclude that he 
cannot; in both cases, a contradiction is concluded.
Many sum up the case of the barber by simply stating that such a barber, 
just like set R, cannot exist. (We will focus on the existential issues in the next 
section.) Another similarity between the BP and RP is based on the structural 
similarity between the key expressions from the formulation setting of the 
paradox, i.e. the description
the individual who shaves all (and only those) individuals who do not shave 
themselves.
However, there are also some important dissimilarities. Firstly, there is a 
huge difference between the sets which should be determined by the two cru-
cial expressions. In the case of the BP the empty set of individuals is specified 
– no individual is its member. In other words, the formula
∀y(Sh(x,y)↔∼Sh(y,y)), where x is free
is unsatisfiable because the condition in question requires somebody who only 
shaves himself when he does not shave himself. However, no possible com-
mon value of variables x and y can have both R and non-R to itself. This led 
Thomson (1962: 104) to the right conclusion that ∼∃x∀y(Sh(x,y)↔∼Sh(y,y)) 
is a theorem of classical logic.10 In the case of RP, on the other hand, the 
empty set is not specified. As documented in the above considerations: no set 
is specified at all.
This important ‘empty set/no set’ difference has a connection with the 
following dissimilarity. If one ascertains that no such village barber can pos-
sibly exist, one gives up the unsupported empirical assumption that there is 
such a barber. The conclusion that there really is no such barber is highly ac-
ceptable. On the other hand, the non-existence of Russell’s set R leads to the 
questioning of the reasonable mathematical assumption that such a set as set 
R should exist. A conclusion that there really is no such set R can be difficult 
to accept. (This explanation was already offered by Quine (1966: 12) and we 
will partly return to such considerations in the next section.)
Employing the standard definition of a paradox, the crucial dissimilarity 
between the two paradoxes consists in the fact that the premise of RP as 
member of this club C – is the secretary of C eligible to join C? In German-speaking regions 
(cf., e.g., Mokre 1952: 82, Brendel 1992: 8) one can also often meet the Self-murderer’s Paradox 
(“Selbstmörder”).
10 In Kalish et al. (2000), it is presented as the theorem (T269): ∼∃y∀x (R(x,y)↔∼R(x,x)).
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an argument is the naïve set theory (the naïve Axiom of Comprehension), 
while the BP as an argument does not contain the set theory as its premise. 
Moreover, the BP contains no naïve theory, thus there is nothing which could 
be contradicted by the conclusion (remember “para-doxa”). Hence, the BP is 
not a paradox at all. This difference between the two arguments can be easily 
recognized in the fact that RP has the effect of refuting of the naïve set theory, 
while the BP does not lead us to the refutation of any naïve theory.
Vigorous refutations of the BP as an analogy of RP can be found at vari-
ous places in the specialized literature, though the explanation just given is 
not, as far as I know, presented there. One of the first dismissals, important 
from the viewpoint of its future acceptance by other writers, is by Grelling 
(1936: 481), who wrote in negative response to Perelman (1936: 205), who 
considered the BP to be a proper logical paradox. Grelling even wrote that the 
solution to the paradox (“joke”) can perhaps be a useful exercise for young stu-
dents of logic. It is then not surprising that the BP, and its version by Johnston 
(cf. above), was already labelled a pseudoparadox by Church (1940: 157).
3. The source of the paradoxicality of the Barber Paradox 
studied with reference to its modifications
When Quine (1966: 12) emphatically wrote “we had never positively be-
lieved in such a barber,” he missed, I think, something important about the 
problem. It is also a bit inconvenient to just throw the BP away onto the 
pseudoparadox dump. Since the BP intuitively seems to be a paradox, any 
serious approach to paradoxes should investigate this fact. Such an attempt is 
made in this section, in which we encounter the phenomenon of the degree 
of paradoxicality.
Firstly, I am going to show how to build a proper paradox from the 
usual formulation of the BP. One has to explicitly add a certain problematic 
premise, i.e. that every property, including
‘being an x such that for every y, x shaves y if and only if y does not 
shave y’,
has at least one bearer, that an individual exists that instantiates the prop-
erty.11 This is contradicted by the conclusion that there can be no such in-
dividual. Of course, the theory of the instantiation of properties is hardly 
11 Instantiation is a relation which links individuals to properties; whenever an indi-
vidual bears (possess, displays) a property, the property is instantiated by the individual. For 
example, when Fido happens to be a dog, he instantiates the property ‘being a dog’. The theory 
of instantiation we discuss above adds a special point: to be a property, the property is to be 
instantiated (a property without a bearer is not a property).
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generally held when considering issues pertaining to paradoxes. Nevertheless, 
this has no effect on what I intend to show, namely that the BP would be a 
proper paradox with such an additional premise.12
An explanation as to why some think the BP is a “simpler version” of 
RP might be that they insert the additional premise into their reconstruc-
tion of the BP. The theory that every property has an instance is correlative 
with the view that every condition (predicate) defines a set, thus the internal 
similarity of RP and the BP, which we noted as lacking in the preceding sec-
tion, would be preserved. Since the theory of the instantiation of properties 
is unlikely to have adherents, this explanation of the BP’s paradoxicality can 
be sidelined.
The supplemented BP is apparently akin to the Horned Man paradox.13 
The Horned Man is not a paradox at all, unless one holds the rather un-
common premise that one really has everything that one has not lost. Thus, 
whether something is considered a paradox depends partly on the degree of 
recognition of the problematic naïve theory. The degree of paradoxicality of 
the Horned Man paradox is very low, while the degree of paradoxicality of 
the recent Hypergame paradox14 is rather high. The degree of paradoxicality 
of RP is smaller than that of the Hypergame paradox, since it has nearly be-
come a logician’s platitude (to use Quine’s own wording15) that some condi-
tions do not define a set.16
Now let us focus on the source of the paradoxicality of the BP as it is 
normally conceived. For my findings it is convenient to recall that during 
ordinary human communication speakers often assume that we are speak-
12 Note also the fact that one formulation of a paradox may give rise to more than one 
paradox as an argument, or a paradox and a non-paradox. If some reader of an incomplete 
formulation is unable to reconstruct a paradox in his mind, then she sees no paradox. For 
example, the readers such as Grelling or Church read the formulation of the BP in such a way 
that there is clearly no paradox (as we will see later, they disambiguated the BP’s crucial phrase 
such a way that a paradoxical conclusion is excluded).
13 What you have not lost, you have. But you have not lost horns. Therefore, you have 
horns.
14 See, e.g., Zwicker (1987). To sketch out the formulation at least partly: the moves in 
the Hypergame consist in the playing of games and the problem arises if the Hypergame itself 
is chosen in some move. The paradox affects game theory, and not set theory as it might seem 
from my simplifying description.
15 “One man’s antinomy can be another man’s veridical paradox, and one man’s veridical 
paradox can be another man’s platitude” (Quine 1966: 12).
16 How to measure degree of paradoxicality exactly is not an easy matter – it is like 
measuring a degree of (say) surprise for a gift or novelty of some news. The degree apparently 
depends on individuals, but it would be more fruitful to find some other basis (e.g. one’s con-
ceptual background, ‘background context’, assumptions) in order to apply logical methods of 
measuring e.g. distances between formulas.
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ing about existing things: to repeat Strawson’s well-known example, when 
somebody says that his children went to sleep, we usually presuppose that 
he has some children. The formulation of the BP even begins with the as-
sumption that such a village barber exists, or can exist. After examining the 
paradox, however, we concluded that there could be no such barber. We are 
thus putting our finger on the most probable cause of the BP’s paradoxicality, 
which consists in a hidden ambiguity of meaning. The two meanings of the 
crucial expression imply distinct existential assumptions, and this is the root 
of the contradiction.17
Due to the irreflexive reading of the BP’s crucial expression – i.e. “shaves 
all those who do not shave themselves” – the barber shaves all others, eve-
rybody except himself. (The suggestion to replace the quantifier “all” with 
the quantifier “all others”, using thus an addition of (x≠y) in the antecedent 
of the biconditional which was formally stated above, was already made by 
van Benthem (1978: 52).) This is perhaps a natural reading because an ar-
tisan or specialist is often understood to be somebody who does something 
for others.18 However, the question “Does he shave himself?” led hearers to 
speculate about the other meaning of the expression: its reflexive reading, due 
to which the artisan can also serve himself likewise.
I have said that the paradoxicality of the BP originates in the fact that the 
following sentences are contradictory:
(P)   There exists a barber who shaves (all and only) those who do not shave 
themselves,
(C)  There does not exist a barber who shaves (all and only) those who do not 
shave themselves.
However, the premise P and the conclusion C are only contradictory pro-
vided they are both read in the reflexive sense. With the reflexive reading, 
sentence C is logically (i.e. necessarily) true. If P is really contradictory to C, P 
is logically false. It thus implies a specific existential assumption as regards the 
barber, namely that no such barber can possibly exist.
Nevertheless, it is rather unnatural to understand P just in the reflexive 
sense. Especially if one assumes, as the reader of the paradox does, that such 
a barber can exist. P is thus understood rather as P’:
17 A little remark on interplay of degree of paradoxicality and ambiguity in meaning is 
in order. Ambiguity in meaning is a one of the factors which cause paradoxicality thus it also 
affects its degree. The BP is a good example: having a sharp meaning of “shave” in their mind, 
Grelling and Church could see no paradox in the BP, while common people can be puzzled; 
the degree of their puzzlement is to some extent correlative with their ability to disambiguate 
the crucial phrase of the BP.
18 On the other hand, some professions involve reflexivity – e.g. a babysitter usually takes 
care also about her children.
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(P’) There exists a barber who shaves all (and only) others who do not shave 
themselves.
With this irreflexive reading, P − i.e. P’ − is contingently true. Its relevant 
specific existential assumption thus differs from that of the reflexive reading: 
such a barber can exist by a contingent chance.
To sum up, the paradoxicality of the BP consists in the fact that the 
premise P, which is assumed to be possibly true (being rather P’), turned 
out to be necessarily false, because the meaning of the crucial expression has 
switched.
One might perhaps utilize the above observation concerning P and P’ to 
say that the BP is analogous to RP after all. In this case, the following argu-
ment would be advanced as the explicit form of the BP:
(P”)  Possibly, there is a barber who shaves all (and only) those who do not 
shave themselves.
(C”) Necessarily, there is no barber who shaves all (and only) those who do 
not shave themselves.
The explicit form of RP would be quite analogous to this, but mentioning set 
membership instead of a barber and shaving.
Despite this one similarity, a principal difference still remains between 
the two paradoxes because one must consider the relevant conditions of being 
true. The possible existence of such a barber should occur within the em-
pirical world of material beings and the internal consistency or inconsistency 
involved in the description of the barber is a plain matter. However, Russell’s 
set R should exist within the realm of immaterial mathematical entities, in 
which a consistency question is usually considered to be a condicio sine qua 
non.
4. Conclusion
In the first main section of this paper, I have argued that, according to the 
standard definition of a paradox, the BP is not a paradox at all. In its usual 
form, the BP harbours no naïve theory (in the form of a problematic premise) 
which could be contradicted by its conclusion. The BP thus has only an in-
cidental resemblance to RP. Various similarities and dissimilarities between 
both paradoxes have been discussed throughout the whole paper.
In the second main section, I have focused on the problem of the degree 
of paradoxicality. A probable source of the admitted paradoxicality of the BP 
consists in the ambiguity in the meaning of the verb “shave”, and thus the 
crucial phrase of the BP, which results in different conclusions concerning the 
possible existence of a certain barber. We have seen then that the nature of 
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these existential assumptions of the BP differs significantly from that of the 
assumptions involved in the background of RP.19
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